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The Great British ‘rebalancing’ act: the construction and implementation of an 
economic imperative for exceptional times 
 
Craig Berry and Colin Hay 
 
Abstract 
 
The ‘rebalancing’ of the British economy has become perhaps the central motif in the public 
political economy of adjustment to the financial crisis. The paper examines the social 
construction of the ‘rebalancing’ imperative and associated policies, arguing that rebalancing 
discourse has served to circumscribe the parameters of acceptable state intervention in 
response to the crisis. It is, accordingly, to be seen as a temporary exception, after which laissez-
faire can be restored. But is there any evidence for such a rebalancing? In the second half of the 
paper we assess the extent to which its objectives have been realised in substantive economic 
policy change, demonstrating a disjuncture between the rhetoric and practice of rebalancing – a 
communicative dissonance. This leads us to question not only the extent to which rebalancing 
has been pursued in public policy, but also the likelihood that the interventions delineated by 
rebalancing can herald genuine economic change. 
 
Keywords: British economy, economic policy, crisis, rebalancing, economic imperatives, coalition 
government 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Though it has its origins in the early 2000s (Froud et al, 2011), the idea that the British 
economy is unbalanced has emerged as perhaps the single defining motif of official 
economic policy discourse in Britain since the global financial crisis. Its analogue, the 
rebalancing imperative, as we shall term it, has, over this time, become the core 
 2 
principle justifying economic intervention by the state in exceptional times. The concept 
of rebalancing has been employed by elite policy-makers to refer to a long but relatively 
coherent list of economic issues, most obviously the contribution of different sectors 
and different regions to the British economy, but also international trade, and the 
relative importance of saving and investment in contrast to, respectively, private debt 
and consumption. Overall, we contend, rebalancing discourse serves in effect to provide 
a new, if temporally delimited, moral political economy of state intervention: for as long 
as a strong case for sectoral (or other) rebalancing can be maintained, state intervention 
to redress that balance is justified. Such state intervention is good, yet by the same 
token, other forms of state intervention (which cannot be justified in terms of the 
rebalancing imperative), or the very same state intervention extended beyond the 
(exceptional) period in which the economy can be shown to be unbalanced, are bad. As 
such, we contend, rebalancing serves to circumscribe, in public discourse, the 
parameters of state intervention – both sectorally/regionally, in that such state 
intervention should be limited to initiatives that will serve to restore a (natural) 
condition of economic balance and temporally, in that the imperative (and the 
legitimation for intervention it provides) only apply during exceptional times (in which 
the imbalance persists). 
 
In the context of British economic policy making since the 1980s, this rebalancing 
discourse is an intriguing and interesting innovation which bears close scrutiny. It is 
intuitively interesting, we suggest, for four principal reasons: firstly, like many other 
ostensibly persuasive British economic policy logics in recent years, it is couched as an 
imperative – a non-negotiable and binding constraint if good economic performance is 
to be restored. Secondly, however, unlike many such non-negotiable economic 
imperatives (such as competitiveness, fiscal rectitude or central bank independence), it 
is constituted as an internal rather than an external imperative (on the appeal to 
external economic imperatives as non-negotiable see, for instance Hay 2004; Hay and 
Rosamond 2002; Hay and Smith 2005; Watson and Hay 2004). Thirdly, it is 
simultaneously both repoliticising and depoliticising: It is repoliticising in the sense that 
it countenances state intervention where otherwise it would not typically be seen as 
legitimate and, more specifically, a particular form of state intervention capable of 
readjusting the boundaries of economic activity. Yet it is also depoliticising in that it 
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presents rebalancing as a logic of no alternative, and as a technical fix to what is 
presented as a self-evidently technical economic problem.  
 
Finally, and as we have already alluded to, rebalancing constitutes a heavily 
circumscribed and conditional imperative – a license to intervene that is strictly time-
delimited and specific to certain limited outcomes. It defines an imperative which seeks 
to restore a normal condition of balance to the economy, in the exceptional 
circumstances of imbalance. It posits, in effect, a condition of dynamic stability which 
the crisis has disrupted (by the conduct of others), and which can only be restored by a 
degree of state intervention which would not normally be warranted.  Yet what is 
perhaps most intriguing about the rebalancing imperative is that it is difficult (and 
increasingly difficult) to reconcile with economic policy content. It is difficult to discern 
the rebalancing that features so prominently, alongside austerity, in the public rationale 
offered for economic policy change. The same, it need hardly be pointed out, certainly 
cannot be said of austerity itself.   
 
Interestingly, the diagnosis of the British economy as structurally unbalanced bears 
some ostensible similarity with the analysis associated with the identification and 
critique of a ‘privatised Keynesian’ or ‘Anglo-liberal growth model’ (ALGM) (see Crouch 
2009; 2011; Hay 2013; Watson 2010). Rebalancing and ALGM analysis both draw 
attention to the component parts of economic growth, rather than judging the health of 
the economy simply on the basis of aggregate performance as gauged in output growth. 
(The key distinction of ALGM analysis in this regard is probably the emphasis placed on 
the housing market as a source of funds for private consumption, and the apparent 
decline or stagnation in earnings for many employees in the pre-crisis period, neither of 
which have featured in the coalition’s rhetoric on rebalancing.) Furthermore, both 
portray policy-makers as having acted to exacerbate the economy’s flaws (or 
imbalances) in recent years (whether for short-term gain, or through ignorance or 
negligence, or both). While the specific concept of economic balance has not featured 
predominantly in ALGM analysis (other than in use of the now standard terms of debate 
about international trade, for instance), the similarities suggest that rebalancing 
discourse, in offering a diagnosis for Britain’s economic ills, has at least some analytical 
merit, and cannot be dismissed as merely a rhetorical device. Even if rebalancing were 
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primarily rhetorical rather than substantive, it would remain appropriate for political 
economists to subject to scrutiny the rationale for policy action being offered by 
political leaders, and any progress towards such an anticipated or desired results in 
terms of economic outcomes. When the case for rebalancing can be made on its own 
terms, we have even more reason to seek to scrutinise the degree to which the 
perceived imperative has been acted upon, quite apart from the simple desire to hold 
politicians to account. This is not to suggest, however, that inquiry into the ‘meaning’ or 
discursive implications of rebalancing is not also required, and that such implications do 
not impinge heavily upon what is knowable about economic balance, and what is 
achievable through rebalancing. In what follows, we seek to combine an assessment of 
both.  
 
As such, this article subjects rebalancing, or more precisely progress towards a 
condition of greater economic balance (within the terms of the discourse), to empirical 
analysis. It does so by offering a comprehensive assessment of the latest available 
evidence from official sources – a form of immanent critique, in effect (Adorno 1973; 
Antonio 1981). It argues, primarily, that there remains and is likely to remain a 
considerable gulf between the rhetoric of rebalancing, on the one hand, and still largely 
illusory objective of the sectoral recomposition of the economy, on the other. Striving 
for balance, rhetorically, has not as yet led to any profound economic change.  Moreover, 
through both its ambiguity and the temporal and sectoral circumscription of the forms 
of intervention countenanced, the rebalancing imperative may in fact serve to sustain a 
pre-crisis economic order; evidence of a failure to rebalance is unlikely to dampen 
enthusiasm for the agenda itself. The first section of the article briefly documents 
rebalancing discourse, commenting also on some of the apparent implications of its 
employment for how the British economy, and the state’s role within it, is conceived. 
The second section offers an overview of how coalition economic policy relates to 
rebalancing, and the third section, after discussing various analytical issues, presents 
the empirical analysis. 
 
Rebalancing as discourse 
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This section offers an overview of the main appeal to the rebalancing motif by British 
politicians in recent years. It focuses on the coalition government’s communicative 
discourse around its economic policy priorities, that is, its attempt to create a framing 
rationale, in publicly accessible language, for capturing economic policy objectives 
across a range of fields (on the distinction between communicative and coordinative 
discourses see, especially, Schmidt 2008; Hay and Rosamond 2002). 
 
Rebalancing had become a central and defining feature of the Conservatives’ public 
discourse in advance of the 2010 election. The party’s election manifesto promised ‘a 
more balanced economy’ (Conservative Party, 2010). A preceding speech by future 
Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne (2010) claimed academic support for 
rebalancing, arguing that ‘[t]he economics profession is in broad agreement that the 
recovery will only be sustainable if it is accompanied by an internal and external 
rebalancing of our economy’. The Liberal Democrats’ manifesto also contained several 
references to economic balance. It was perhaps unremarkable, therefore, that the 
coalition agreement between the two parties should state very clearly: 
 
We want to create a fairer and more balanced economy, where we are not so 
dependent on a narrow range of economic sectors, and where new businesses and 
economic opportunities are more evenly shared between regions and industries 
(HM Government, 2010: 9). 
 
This was quickly followed by a speech by the new Prime Minister, David Cameron 
(2010), which argued that ‘our economy has become more and more unbalanced, with 
our fortunes hitched to a few industries in one corner of the country, while we let other 
sectors like manufacturing slide’. In 2011, the coalition produced its ‘plan for growth’, 
therefore demonstrating how the rebalancing motif had been implanted into the 
departmental machinery of Whitehall: 
 
Sustainable growth requires a rebalancing of the UK economy away from a reliance 
on a narrow range of sectors and regions, to one built on investment and exports, 
with strong growth more fairly shared across the UK (HM Treasury and 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2011: 28). 
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Several rebalancing priorities emerge from the plan for growth and the surrounding 
discourse: reducing private debt, increasing private savings, increasing business 
investment, improving the trade balance, boosting sectors other than finance 
(particularly manufacturing), and boosting regions other than London and the South 
East. Each might be seen to provide the basis for an evaluation of the Coalition’s 
rebalancing proposition on its own terms (a task to which we turn directly in the next 
section).    
 
The generally implicit, though sometimes explicit, accusation is that the outgoing 
Labour government had caused or failed to address the economic problems which now 
give rise to this agenda. Clearly, the notion of rebalancing suggests that there once was 
balance, that is, some natural economic balance that it is possible to attain. Expressed in 
this context, economic balance implicitly exalts the economic order that was evident 
before New Labour’s reckless economic stewardship. In this respect, what is important 
about the discourse of balance, imbalance and rebalancing is that it clearly apportions 
blame for the crisis and the costs of adjustment to its legacy. Imbalance is an unnatural 
aberration, the product of poor economic management by others, and rebalancing is a 
difficult and exceptional challenge which perhaps cannot be expected to yield clear 
(growth) dividends immediately. That is a comforting and arguably convenient 
conclusion. 
 
However, rebalancing discourse was employed by Labour in government before 2010, 
most notably in the Pre-Budget Report (now known as the Autumn Statement) 
published in 2009. The document contains several references to rebalancing, although 
usually in relation to specific issues (mainly business investment and exports), rather 
than in terms of an overall agenda, and usually in relation to an expectation that such 
rebalancing would occur naturally, post-crisis, rather than as an agenda actively being 
pursued. It was not, in short, an imperative. Although not using the specific term, in his 
speech accompanying the Pre-Budget Report, then Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair 
Darling stated: 
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[G]rowth will come from more varied sources and not depend as much on the 
financial sector which will, of course, remain an important part of our economy. 
Growth will be driven by fresh opportunities to export as the global economy 
expands and by investment by business in the key industries of the future (Darling, 
2009b). 
 
This passage is particularly interesting as it implies a quite stark contrast between 
economic performance at the time and that anticipated in the future (which will be 
more varied in its sources, less dependent on the financial sector, and so forth) but 
without any clear sense of the agency required to effect the transition. A natural process 
of adjustment and healing would appear to be envisaged without the need for any 
concerted state intervention. These remarks echoed similar remarks in Darling’s Budget 
speech earlier that year.  
 
In a similar vein, if perhaps with a little more rhetorical flair, Peter Mandelson, early in 
2010, as Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills stated: 
 
And let me say this quite bluntly: for the past decade, we have allowed ourselves to 
become over-dependent on the City and financial services for growth and our tax 
revenues. That is why, without wishing the financial sector to be smaller, we need 
other industrial strengths and sources of revenue to grow faster (Mandelson, 
2010). 
 
The Labour government were of course reluctant to apportion blame to themselves for 
causing such imbalances. Although Gordon Brown does not appear to have personally 
employed rebalancing discourse to any significant extent in a domestic context, his view 
that the inadequacy of international financial regulation had created global economic 
imbalances, and ultimately the financial crisis, indicates Labour’s view on the political 
source of economic disruption (see Brown, 2010). However, it would be inaccurate to 
identify the Labour government under Gordon Brown’s leadership as the source of the 
rebalancing motif in elite-level public discourse. Indeed, before the establishment of the 
coalition government, the public figure probably most responsible for promulgating 
rebalancing discourse was then Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King. He told 
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the Treasury select committee in 2008 that rebalancing – defined mainly in terms of 
reducing household consumption in favour of business investment – was ‘something 
that I have been expecting, and, indeed, perhaps hoping for, for some time’ (cited in 
House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2008). This might seem at first like a comment 
prompted by the benefit of hindsight. But, tellingly, he was in fact merely restating a 
theme he had set out in almost identical terms as early as 2002: 
 
The strength of consumption and the weakness of net exports have led to an 
imbalance between manufacturing and services. Manufacturing profitability has 
fallen by more than half over the past five years, while in less easily traded services 
profitability has been broadly unchanged. The need to rebalance the British 
economy is clear (King, 2002). 
 
A basic search using the terms ‘rebalancing’ or ‘unbalanced’ on the websites of major 
news organisations in Britain shows that rebalancing discourse appears to have entered 
the lexicon of mainstream media commentary on the economy around this time, or soon 
afterwards, with a Financial Times editorial in 2005 in fact criticising King for his part in 
the failure to address evident imbalances in the British economy. The fact that elite 
discourse on the economy after the financial crisis – which, of course, very few orthodox 
voices saw coming (Hindmoor and McConnell, 2013) – resembles the communicative 
discourse being promulgated by at least some parts of the British political elite before 
the crisis, albeit in a more pronounced way, is perhaps suggestive of the conservatism of 
rebalancing discourse. 
 
There certainly appears to have been a period, however, when rebalancing discourse 
went quiet among policy-makers. It has not been employed by Ed Miliband since he 
became Leader of the Labour Party in 2010 to any significant degree, with no reference 
to rebalancing or related terms in his first four party conference speeches. Interestingly, 
an April 2014 speech by Miliband on Labour’s plans for regional devolution made no 
reference to balance or imbalance, nor to rebalancing – though it was still reported by 
The Guardian as an agenda to ‘rebalance growth’ (Wintour, 2014). After featuring in 
George Osborne’s Budget speech in 2012, it did not feature in his 2013 Budget speech, 
or the two Autumn Statement speeches delivered during this period. It may be possible 
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to relate this relative silence from the Conservatives to the improving performance of 
the British economy; after strong GDP growth in the third quarter of 2012, associated 
with the London Olympics, consistently positive growth results returned in 2013. The 
fact that growth has returned without (as will be discussed below) any significant signs 
of achieving the stated rebalancing priorities may also be relevant. However, not 
everybody in government was reticent about the British economy’s balance during this 
period. Liberal Democrat Business Secretary Vince Cable argued (in an almost 
Cassandra-like way given the improvement in growth performance) that the economy 
 
needs rebalancing through a shift to exports and investment rather than debt-
based consumption – specifically towards long-term investment in productive 
assets rather than short-term speculative property accumulation. To succeed in 
this task is necessarily the work of many years (Cable, 2013). 
 
However, in February 2014, after a long silence on the theme, George Osborne also 
returned to the rebalancing motif. This was, in part, to proclaim the success of 
rebalancing, arguing for instance that manufacturing and construction were 
contributing to strong growth results. Yet he added, perhaps tellingly: 
 
[T]he recovery is not yet secure and our economy is still too unbalanced. We 
cannot rely on consumers alone for our economic growth, as we did in previous 
decades. And we cannot put all our chips on the success of the City of London, as 
my predecessors did. Britain is not investing enough. Britain is not exporting 
enough. There are encouraging signs. Both business investment and exports are 
forecast to grow. But we can’t be passive observers of the forecasts.  We need to 
roll up our sleeves, get to work and make it happen (Osborne, 2014b). 
 
In his Budget speech a month later, Osborne explained that ‘[a] resilient economy is a 
more balanced economy with more exports, more building, more investment – and 
more manufacturing too. We’ve got to support our manufacturers if we want to see 
more growth in our regions’ (Osborne, 2014a). It is of course difficult to identify 
whether these later examples of the Conservatives’ rebalancing discourse differ from 
those evident in the 2010-2012 period. Certainly, there is no explicit criticism here of 
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private debt (in contrast to Cable’s argument) though there would at least appear to be 
an acknowledgement of the increasing importance of private debt to growth – a theme 
we explore in more detail presently. Moreover, and in contrast to earlier quotes and 
references, rebalancing is here presented not only as an imperative (as something 
which needs to be done), but as an animating imperative and vision (informing directly 
what might be done and is being done). 
 
It is worth noting that in his February 2014 speech, Osborne described the City of 
London as a ‘success’ – the sole caveat being that we have become too dependent on this 
success, not that such success may itself have deleterious consequences. This indicates 
another important hallmark of rebalancing discourse, that is, the suggestion that all of 
the component parts of the economic model are legitimate, and capable of functioning 
effectively, but they have simply become disordered or distended for some reason (for 
an alternative analysis, see Hay and Payne 2015). There is a sense, for instance, that 
sectors such as manufacturing can be boosted simply by policy-makers deciding to 
focus their fiscal levers on the sector, and not by focusing on the relationship between 
manufacturing and sectors such as finance. Different sectors and regions are presented 
as equally capable of strong growth, irrespective of the existing interplay and 
interaction between sectors and regions and the power relations inherent in such 
dynamics. State intervention is limited both temporally and inter-sectorally to 
encouraging, levering or cajoling sectors closer or further away from the economy’s 
fulcrum so that a natural – and self-sustaining – balance can be re-secured. Closely 
related to this is the notion that achieving balance would require only minor, 
technocratic modifications to economic practice, rather than radical change (see Froud 
et al, 2011). For this reason, the primary fiscal levers pulled by the state are minor tax 
adjustments, rather than, say, major public investment programmes or corporate 
governance reform. In this sense, rebalancing echoes the motif of ‘stability’, pivotal to 
New Labour’s economic statecraft (Clift and Tomlinson, 2006). As such, rebalancing 
implies a further imperative, albeit for inaction rather than action. In terms of more 
stringent financial regulation, not throwing the baby out with the bathwater is 
established as a policy priority, achievable only via sober, technocratic decision-making 
processes rather than a politicised or emotive response to the financial crisis. 
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Before discussing the rebalancing agenda in practice (what has been done), it is 
important to discuss here the relationship between rebalancing and elite discourse on 
‘austerity’, or in other words, the extent to which the coalition government’s desire to 
reduce the public deficit has been presented as an issue of economic balance. This is not 
a straightforward issue. Clearly, the idea that the public finances themselves are 
unbalanced (between revenue and spending) is commonplace in British politics. Yet in 
terms of the balance between the public and private sectors, of the sources cited above, 
only the Conservative Party’s 2010 election manifesto strongly identifies high levels of 
public spending as a key source of economic imbalance. Interestingly, however, as 
explored in the next section, a retreat by the state or public sector is often presented 
implicitly as a pre-requisite of achieving balance in the private sector. As this suggests, 
whether seen as complementary or in tension, both themes have played an important 
discursive role, meaning that rebalancing within the private sector can be usefully 
explored while avoiding the implication that this is all the coalition government cares 
about. 
 
Rebalancing as programmatic intent 
 
This section briefly discusses the coalition government’s policy programme, insofar as it 
relates to rebalancing. Of course, the main agenda pursued by the government has been 
cuts in public spending. While not unrelated to rebalancing, this agenda has been 
presented principally using communicative discourse related to the concept of 
austerity. Pursuing rebalancing, in contrast, does not automatically necessitate such 
cuts; indeed, the coalition has frequently sought to highlight areas where new public 
investment initiatives (despite a significant reduction in general spending) ostensibly 
boost the rebalancing effort, such as the HS2 rail network.  
 
Yet the notion that the state must get out of the way of the private sector, in order for 
rebalancing to occur, has animated rebalancing policies to some extent. Deregulatory 
initiatives such the Red Tape Challenge and so-called ‘bonfire of the quangos’ were 
heavily promoted early in the life of the coalition, but have led to relatively few 
substantive reforms. More important have been changes to taxation, as the government 
has sought to introduce tax ‘incentives’ (and simplification) to encourage private sector 
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economic actors to grow, invest, and create jobs; the main example being the gradual 
reduction of the main rate of corporation tax to 20 per cent by 2015 (the same rate 
applied to small firms). There have also been cuts to personal taxes, with a reduction in 
the top rate of income tax to 45 per cent from 50 per cent, and gradual increases in the 
income tax personal allowance. These tax cuts of course reduce Exchequer revenue, and 
are therefore, ostensibly, anti-austerity. Interestingly, the personal tax cuts are also pro-
consumption. There have, however, been changes which have restricted consumption, 
such as a higher rate of Value Added Tax, and cuts to social security benefits (although 
the latter should probably be seen in the context of a broader attempt to incentivise 
employment; the flagship welfare reform, Universal Credit, costs more than the systems 
it is replacing, other things being equal (Brewer et al, 2011)). 
 
The coalition government has proselytised consistently the need to boost 
manufacturing; its early agenda in this regard was laid out in the 2011 ‘plan for growth’, 
which identified ‘advanced manufacturing’ as a priority. However, with the partial 
exception of increased support for university research centres focused on 
manufacturing, policy has replicated longstanding practices within British industrial 
policy: interventions are aimed at the micro level, and generally take the form of ‘soft’ 
support, such as advice services, gateway services and the dissemination of best 
practice (Buigues and Sekkat, 2009). More recently, attempts have been made to reduce 
manufacturers’ energy costs by removing environmental levies, although this probably 
represents a partial marginalisation of the advanced manufacturing agenda, and should 
be seen in light of related efforts to support ‘reshoring’, that is, the return of low-skilled 
manufacturing production to Britain that had previously been ‘offshored’, facilitated 
principally by declining relative wages in the British manufacturing sector. 
Manufacturers have also, apparently, been the main target of increases to the annual 
investment allowance, that is, the capital investment that firms are able to offset against 
their corporation tax liabilities – the allowance has been increased gradually to £0.5 
million, with this rate persisting to 2015. However, reform of the allowance will have a 
limited impact on the manufacturing sector, as it relies on investment being funded by 
retained profits. British manufacturing has become increasingly unprofitable, and in any 
case, is largely typified by small firms. 
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In terms of other initiatives in support of investment, the government’s flagship 
National Infrastructure Plan offers a long list of investment ambitions, albeit with the 
vast majority of funding expected to come from private sources (see Helm, 2013). The 
government has also looked to pension funds to invest greater amounts in 
infrastructure, but the Pension Infrastructure Platform has failed to attract significant 
support, with most contributions coming from public sector or pseudo-public pension 
funds.1 The Bank of England’s Funding for Lending scheme was intended to encourage 
banks to make finance available to the corporate sector, particularly small firms, but it 
has been used principally to support mortgage lending (its terms were therefore 
revised by the Bank in November 2013). By abolishing the Regional Development 
Agencies (replaced in name only by Local Enterprise Partnerships), the government has 
forgone the approach to regional investment which has traditionally served as a proxy 
for industrial policy in Britain (Buigues and Sekkat, 2009). 
 
Attempts to boost manufacturing have not encompassed efforts to tackle the sector’s 
principal, and longstanding, source of weakness, that is, the unwillingness of British 
banks to offer long-term finance (Froud et al, 2011; Hay, 2013; Watson and Hay, 1998; 
Williams et al, 1983). Finance sector reform is of course an issue relevant to rebalancing 
in its own right; the coalition government has instituted a new macro-prudential 
framework for bank regulation (augmenting the micro-prudential framework 
established by Labour), legislated for a ‘ring fence’ around individual deposits to shield 
them from risks associated with investment banking, and introduced a levy targeted at 
discourage excessive short-term borrowing. The government will claim that its 
regulatory changes in this area have been substantial, yet the agenda is clearly focussed 
on mitigating banking sector volatility and its effects, rather than reorienting bank 
lending and investment practices; the government’s conservative approach is 
exemplified by the ongoing privatisation, largely unaltered, of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group, forgoing an opportunity to lever reform of bank 
practices through strategic public ownership. The government has established the 
Green Investment Bank (GIB), ostensibly to direct investments to activities not well 
served by private banks, yet the GIB is limited in size and, in fact, not a bank in any 
meaningful sense (it cannot borrow money or issue credit). They have also rejected calls 
to establish a state investment bank, with a remit to invest more in Northern regions, 
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and consistently opposed co-ordinated attempts by other European Union members to 
establish a tax on certain short-term financial transactions. There have been few 
genuine attempts to boost saving by individuals, although the coalition have taken 
forward the previous government’s plans for automatic enrolment in private pension 
schemes. In general, extremely low interest rates drown out any initiatives designed to 
boost regular saving. Similarly, there has been virtually no action to curtail household 
indebtedness, despite some new restrictions on costly ‘payday lending’. 
 
Economic policies that have been pursued independently of the ostensible rebalancing 
agenda are also worth noting here. It is difficult to interpret quantitative easing (QE), for 
instance, in terms of rebalancing. Yet it is a crucial aspect of the coalition’s economic 
stewardship. It has undoubtedly acted against the balance promoted in the 
government’s communicative discourse by boosting the financial services sector, among 
other things, but whether such effects are intentional is arguable. Support for the 
housing market is also relevant; crucially, while the housing market has been identified 
as a key feature of the Anglo-liberal growth model, issues around housing have not 
featured heavily in rebalancing discourse. The coalition would probably argue that 
attempts to boost the housing market – indirectly through low interest rates, perhaps 
inadvertently through Funding for Lending, both noted above, and directly and 
deliberately through the mortgage guarantee scheme Help to Buy – are incidental to 
broader efforts to boost business investment, manufacturing, exports, and so forth. It is 
implausible, however, to suggest that the government is unaware of the role of a strong 
housing market in facilitating household consumption and, indeed, its less direct role in 
incentivising banks to lend to individuals rather than industry (a ‘crowding out’ effect). 
 
We should of course not be surprised that the communicative discourse around 
rebalancing is an imperfect fit for the policy agenda being pursued in practice by the 
coalition government. It offers a simple idea that cannot possibly convey the motives 
behind countless, complex policy choices. At the same time, however, it offers a 
relatively novel means of describing an economic policy agenda that is in fact far from 
novel, or only novel in the sense that it intensifies practices long evident in British 
economic statecraft (or adopts new forms of intervention in order to preserve or 
restore aspects of the British economic model undermined by the financial crisis). In 
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this context, it seems especially important that George Osborne revisited rebalancing 
discourse in 2014; whatever judgement we may form about its practical implications, 
rebalancing is certainly something the Conservatives and/or the coalition want to be 
able to claim has occurred, and still want to be seen to be pursuing. 
 
Evaluating the rebalancing act 
 
This section offers an empirical assessment of rebalancing, that is, progress towards 
redressing the imbalances highlighted in rebalancing discourse, between the eve of the 
financial crisis and the present moment (that is, the latest available data at the time of 
writing). The measures or ‘benchmarks’ included in this assessment are: the relative 
size of manufacturing and (financial) services in the British economy, and jobs and pay 
in these sectors; the extent to which bank lending practices have been reoriented, 
primarily towards manufacturing and away from the housing market; the relative size 
of different regions in the British economy, and employment and pay across the regions; 
median earnings and the earnings distribution; the relative importance of household 
consumption and (business) investment within GDP; the trade balance, and the extent 
to which the export base has been reoriented towards manufactured goods and 
emerging economies; the ratio of house prices to earnings, the level of mortgage 
approvals, and the extent of housing equity withdrawal; the extent of consumer 
borrowing, and the ratio of debt to disposable income, and; the savings ratio. Table 1 
summarises the progress, or otherwise, explored in more detail below. 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of ‘rebalancing’ progress 
Issue Latest 
data 
 
Sectors 
Contribution to 
GVA 
Late 
2013 
Slight fall for manufacturing, matched by finance/insurance, 
although services sector in general grown to almost four-fifths 
of the UK’s GVA 
Jobs Late 
2013 
Large reduction in manufacturing jobs, contrasted with a small 
reduction for finance/insurance and significant increase for 
services in general 
Pay 2013 Both manufacturing and finance/insurance have seen rises in 
pay relative to the national average, although pay in 
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finance/insurance remains substantially higher 
Receipt of bank 
lending 
Early 
2014 
Focus of bank lending on housing market has intensified, 
although there has been a small reduction of proportion 
devoted to financial intermediation. Proportion for 
manufacturing almost halved to around 1 per cent 
Regions 
Contribution to 
GVA 
2012 Slight rise for London, with proportion for all other regions 
declining 
GVA per head 2012 Small rises for London and the South-East relative to national 
measure. Slight rises for the North-West and North-East , 
although all Northern regions remain substantially below 
national measure 
Unemployment Late 
2013 
Unemployment has risen in London and the South-East far less 
than all other regions; unemployment in Northern regions now 
higher than London 
Pay Late 
2013 
Regional pay inequality largely unchanged, although small 
reduction in London’s lead relative to national average, and 
significant reduction in relative pay in the North-East 
Trade   
Trade balance 2013 Small improvement in trade deficit, with exports increasing 
slightly faster than imports 
Sectoral 
composition of 
exports 
2013 Manufactured goods comprise lower proportion of the export 
base, with proportion for financial and business services 
largely unchanged 
Destination of 
exports 
2013 Dependence on Europe and the United States has reduced to 
some extent, although the BRIC countries account for only a 
slightly higher proportion of UK exports 
Investment and consumption 
Proportion of GDP Late 
2013 
Proportion of GDP accounted for by consumption unchanged; 
significant reduction for investment, including small reduction 
for business investment 
Housing market 
Size of market Early 
2014 
Significant reduction in the total value of mortgage approvals 
House prices Early 
2014 
Average prices now surpassed pre-crisis peak, although large 
regional differences with London and the South-East 
significantly above peak, and Northern regions still 
significantly below 
House 
price/earnings 
ratio 
2013 Slight fall in ratio of average price to median earnings, and 
lower quartile price to lower quartile earnings 
Housing equity 
withdrawal 
Late 
2013 
Fewer transactions and more housebuilding means equity is 
now being created rather than withdrawn 
Debt and savings 
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Savings ratio Early 
2014 
Small rise in savings ratio compared to 2007, but with ratio 
declining significantly as the economy returns to growth 
Household debt-
to-income ratio 
2013 Significant fall in debt-to-income ratio, but forecast to return to 
pre-crisis levels over the next few years 
Earnings    
Median earnings 2013 Significant reduction in full-time earnings, exacerbated by shift 
to lower-paid part-time employment and self-employment 
Earnings 
distribution 
2013 Largely unchanged, although higher earners now earn slightly 
more as proportion of national average,  and lower earners 
earn slightly less 
 
 
There are, however, several analytical issues that must be explored initially. Firstly, an 
assessment of public-to-private sector rebalancing is beyond the scope of this article, 
since, as explored above, reducing the size of the public sector is seen to arise from the 
imperative of austerity rather than rebalancing in coalition discourse. Additionally, the 
public/private sector boundary is far from straightforward, and indeed can be directly 
manipulated by government. By contrast, and secondly, evidence on both the housing 
market and earnings is included, despite the fact that neither appears to have been 
identified as a rebalancing priority. Given the role the housing market has played in 
supporting household consumption in recent years (Watson 2010; Hay 2013), we 
consider evidence on its performance paramount to assessing the extent of economic 
change. Moreover, both this role for the housing market and the apparent decline or 
stagnation in earnings for many individuals are highlighted in ALGM analysis as key 
parts of the (flawed) pre-crisis economic model in the UK.  
 
A third issue relates to the limitations of official data sources. There are of course 
inherent problems of time lag and definition: by the time evidence about a given trend is 
collected or codified, the trend may have changed (this problem is of course 
compounded by the time lag in the creation and publication of any assessment based on 
this evidence). More importantly, it must be recognised that official data are subject to 
the institutional dynamics and ideational pressures acting upon its creators, and may in 
some cases represent a strategic act by the creators in pursuance of a particular goal. 
Such problems are largely inescapable; the breadth of measures employed here 
mitigates, to some extent, against the imperfections inherent in each individual 
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measure, but generally speaking, this means than any empirical analysis based on 
official data must be presented, and interpreted, cautiously. 
 
Finally, there is the question of whether it is fair to evaluate the government’s success in 
rebalancing the economy at this stage (that is, summer 2014). Problematically, while 
some of the evidence included here is relatively current, at the time of writing, in some 
cases the latest available evidence is much earlier than 2014 (2012, for instance, in the 
case of regional output data). Typically, however, the evidence presented here relates 
the pre-crisis period to the end of 2013 or early 2014. It is of course correct to say that 
rebalancing may occur in the future, or may be happening presently, as a result of 
changes enacted by the coalition government, even if not yet evident (evidence from 
official forecasts is also presented below, where available, to partially alleviate this 
problem – although forecasts clearly compound many of the problems related to the 
production of official statistics). However, even if all the data were current, and 
forecasts were wholly reliable, it may still be the case that the success of rebalancing, or 
otherwise, cannot be judged over such a short period of time. A number of responses to 
this charge are possible. Firstly, evaluating progress now does not preclude subsequent 
evaluation, and may indeed be useful to policy-makers insofar as they are able to chart 
progress to date. Secondly, whether credible in its own terms or not, rebalancing has 
been presented as a coalition government priority – and the coalition was not designed 
to last beyond 2015. Having said this, and thirdly, it is necessary to reiterate that the 
analysis here is not designed simply to evaluate the economic policy performance of the 
coalition government. The first section noted that rebalancing is not exclusively a 
coalition agenda, and the second section noted that the coalition’s economic policy 
programme has not focused on rebalancing to any meaningful extent. Moreover, the 
analysis includes issues which have not featured significantly in coalition discourse on 
rebalancing. It is best conceived as an evaluation of post-crisis change within the British 
economy – albeit an agenda for change which the coalition government is, in large part, 
publicly committed. Fourthly, to agree with the proposition that rebalancing cannot 
have been expected to have occurred by 2014 (or earlier) is to accept uncritically the 
notion that there is such a thing as economic balance, that can be met at some future 
point (just not yet). This article challenges this premise.  
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Sectors 
 
There is little evidence of a rebalancing between the manufacturing and services sectors 
in the British economy. In the third quarter of 2007, manufacturing represented around 
11 per cent of Britain’s gross value added (GVA); by the third quarter of 2013, it had 
fallen to 10 per cent. Finance and insurance had also fallen over this period, from 10 per 
cent to 9 per cent, although the proportion of Britain’s GVA represented by the services 
sector in general rose from 77 per cent to 79 per cent. In terms of jobs, the 
manufacturing sector lost around 330,000 jobs over this period (a 12 per cent 
reduction), whereas finance and insurance saw a reduction of around 30,000 jobs (2 per 
cent), and the services sector in general saw an increase of 1.3 million jobs (5 per cent). 
Pay levels also offer little sign of rebalancing. In 2007 average weekly pay in 
manufacturing was 13 per cent above the national average – this rose to 17 per cent in 
2013. Finance and insurance workers, however, were paid 116 per cent more than the 
national average in 2007, rising to 119 per cent by 2013. In the services sector in 
general, workers were paid 97 per cent of the national average in both 2007 and 2013.2 
 
In terms of the availability of credit, the concentration of bank lending on the housing 
market, at the expense of manufacturers, has intensified. In the fourth quarter of 2007, 
35 per cent of lending by British monetary financial institutions to British residents 
went to individuals, including 28 per cent to lending secured on dwellings (that is, 
mortgages). Financial intermediation (and auxiliary activities) accounted for 36 per 
cent of lending, and manufacturing accounted for only 2 per cent. In the first quarter of 
2014, 48 per cent of lending went to individuals, including 44 per cent to lending 
secured on dwellings. Financial intermediation accounted for 28 per cent of lending, 
and manufacturing accounted for an even lower proportion, just over 1 per cent.3 
 
Regions 
 
Similarly, there is little evidence of rebalancing between Britain’s regions and nations. 
In 2007, London represented 21 per cent of Britain’s GVA; by 2012 (the latest available 
data), this had risen to 22 per cent. Every other region, and the devolved nations, shrank 
in relative terms over this period (with the exception of the South East, where the 
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proportion was constant as 14 per cent).  In terms of GVA per head across the regions, 
in London this measure increased from 168 per cent of the national average to 172 per 
cent between 2007 and 2012, and in the South East it increased from 105 per cent of the 
national average to 107 per cent. Most other regions, and the devolved nations, saw 
their relative score decline; there were slight increases in the North West and North 
East, although in 2012 these regions had a GVA per head, respectively, only 85.1 per 
cent and 74.3 per cent of the national average. 
 
Interestingly, while at the end of 2007 London had a higher unemployment rate than 
anywhere else in Britain, by the end of 2013 its unemployment rate had fallen below 
that of the three regions of Northern England, and the West Midlands (similarly, its 
employment rate had risen above these regions). Unemployment has risen in all regions 
over this period, although far less in the South East and East of England – the regions 
with the lowest unemployment rates at the end of 2007 – than anywhere else, with the 
exception of London. Regional pay inequality has remained largely unchanged between 
the end of 2007 and the end of 2013. Measured in terms of gross weekly earnings 
among full-time employees, pay in London is slightly lower as a proportion of the 
national average, having fallen from 126 per cent to 124 per cent. Average pay in the 
three regions of Northern England, and Northern Ireland, remains below 90 per cent of 
the national average, and has fallen dramatically in the North East from 87 per cent to 
82 per cent.4 
 
Trade 
 
Britain’s trade balance remains in deficit, but has improved. From 2011 to 2013, the 
average annual deficit was around £29 billion, whereas from 2005 to 2007 it was 
almost £36 billion (it is useful to consider trade data over a longer period than a single 
year, because year-on-year fluctuations tend to be significant). The value of total 
imports has increased over this period, but the value of exports has increased at a 
slightly faster rate. However, when the sectoral composition of the export base is 
considered in more detail, the rebalancing story seems somewhat less convincing. 
Financial services made up the same proportion of total exports in 2011-2013 that they 
did in 2005-2007, 10 per cent, and business services exports make up a higher 
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proportion, rising from 10 per cent to 11 per cent. The export base is also now more 
dependent on oil, with the proportion rising from 6 per cent to 8 per cent over this 
period. The proportion of exports accounted for by both finished manufactured goods 
and semi-manufactured goods has fallen from, respectively, 32 per cent to 29 per cent, 
and 19 per cent to 17 per cent. 
 
In terms of export destinations, Britain’s dependence on trade with Europe has lessened 
only slightly. In fact, Germany has overtaken the United States as Britain’s most 
important export destination – although at the same time, the trade balance with 
Germany has deteriorated slightly from a deficit of £20 billion in 2007 to £23 billion in 
2013. The proportion of total exports going to the Netherlands, France and Ireland – the 
UK’s other key trading partners in 2007 – has also increased significantly; the 
significant trade deficit previously evident with both the Netherlands and France has 
receded slightly. There is some sign of the export base being reoriented to emerging 
economies. Between 2007 and 2013, the proportion of exports going to China, India and 
Brazil increased, but only from, respectively, 1 per cent to 2.5 per cent, 0.8 per cent to 1 
per cent, and 0.3 per cent to 0.5 per cent. More importantly, trade deficits with both 
China and India increased significantly, although a tiny trade deficit with Brazil has been 
converted into an even tinier trade surplus.5 Chart 1 shows change over time in the 
proportion of UK exports accounted for by the European Union, North America, the 
BRIC countries, and the rest of the world. 
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Source: ONS (2013) 
 
Investment and consumption 
 
Although neither substitutes for the other, increasing the proportion of gross domestic 
product (GDP) accounted for by investment (particularly business investment), at the 
expense of consumption, is a key rebalancing objective. However, there has been no 
progress in this regard. In the fourth quarter of 2013, the proportion of the British 
economy’s output accounted for by household final consumption expenditure was 62 
per cent, a slight increase on the figure for the fourth quarter of 2007, 61.7 per cent. The 
proportion accounted for by investment (that is, gross fixed capital formation, declined 
significantly over this period, from 17.8 per cent to 14.5 per cent, including a slight fall 
in the proportion accounted for by business investment, from 8.7 per cent to 8.2 per 
cent.6 
 
Official economic forecasts, however, predict a strong recovery in investment in coming 
years. Despite the presumption of a 1 per cent decline in business investment 
throughout 2013, the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) expects annual business 
investment growth to average 8 per cent from 2014 to 2017. However, business 
investment is the component of GDP that has, since the recession, been forecast 
incorrectly most consistently. From 2011 to 2013, annual business investment growth 
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has averaged 2 per cent. In 2010, the OBR expected this figure to be 9 per cent, and in 
2011 they expected it to be 5 per cent. In 2012, the OBR expected business investment 
growth in 2013 to be 5 per cent, compared to an outturn of -1 per cent. The OBR 
explains, in its 2014 forecast, that business investment is linked to overall economic 
growth – because the growth they expected previously did not materialise, nor did the 
business investment (see OBR, 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014). However, no evidence 
for this view is presented; this does not necessarily make it an unreasonable 
assumption, although no such association was evident during the immediate pre-crisis 
period, when strong overall GDP growth did not coincide with strong business 
investment growth. 
 
Housing market 
 
The housing market has not recovered all of the ground lost as a result of the financial 
crisis and recession. The value of total mortgage approvals in January 2014 was £19 
billion, compared to £34 billion in January 2007.7 Yet the average price of the houses 
that are being traded has now exceeded its pre-crisis peak, with the average house price 
in the UK in the second quarter of 2014 1.3 per cent above the average for the third 
quarter of 2007. This trend, however, hides a quite remarkable regional divergence. 
According to the widely-used Nationwide House Price Index, average house prices in 
the North-West (excluding Cumbria) have fallen by 8.9 per cent over this period, and by 
8.8 and 7 per cent, respectively, in Yorkshire and Humberside, and the North-East and 
Cumbria. In contrast, the average house price in London rose by 32.4 per cent over this 
period, and by 14.3 per cent in the outer metropolitan area of London, and 7 per cent in 
the rest of the South-East.8 Prices are of course now rising steadily in all of the Northern 
regions, albeit not as quickly as in London and the South-East. In terms of house prices 
relative to earnings, the ratio of median house price to median annual earnings (of full-
time employees) in England fell slightly from 7.2 in 2007 to 6.7 in 2013. However, it 
remains much higher than the ratio evident in the late 1990s and early 2000s. There is a 
similar story at the lower end of the housing market: the ratio of the lower quartile 
house price to lower quartile median earnings in England fell slightly from 7.2 to 6.5, 
although this much higher than the ratio evident in the late 1990s and early 2000s.9 
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The prevalence of housing equity withdrawal (the difference between net secured 
lending to households, and increases in the stock of housing wealth when either new 
properties are built, or improvements are made to existing ones) was an important 
feature of the pre-crisis growth model, and helped to fund consumption despite the 
‘squeeze’ on earnings (Hay, 2013). From late 2006 to late 2007, an average of almost £9 
billion in housing equity per quarter was withdrawn per quarter. However, housing 
equity is no longer being withdrawn on this scale, and indeed withdrawals are now 
negative, with an average of almost -£12 billion per quarter being withdrawn from late 
2012 to late 2013.10 The Bank of England, however, has suggested that this reversal 
does not in fact represent a fundamental economic change, but rather reflects the fact 
that fewer housing transactions are restricting the opportunity for equity withdrawals 
(Reinold, 2011), and that a higher rate of housebuilding (associated with Help to Buy) 
has led to the creation of new equity (Stewart, 2013). 
 
Debt and savings 
 
The savings ratio (household saving as a proportion of total household resources) 
appears initially to have been the most successful example of rebalancing since 2010. 
The ratio has increased from 3 per cent in the third quarter of 2007, to 5 per cent in the 
first quarter of 2014. To put this into context, the savings ratio was only 3.9 per cent in 
the third quarter of 2001. However, this simple account ignores the relationship 
between the phase of the business cycle and saving. The saving ratio actually climbed 
dramatically before the coalition government took office, to around 8 per cent 
throughout 2009 and early 2010, and the most recent figure is a ‘snapshot’ in a saving 
ratio that has since declined significantly. Indeed, the OBR (2014) forecasts that the 
savings ratio will fall back further, declining to 3.6 per cent as early as 2016. During the 
last recession, in the early 1990s, the savings ratio peaked at a higher rate, around 11 
per cent, and did decline significantly for several years afterwards. It is reasonable to 
conclude, therefore, that the economy has not witnessed an unusually large swing 
towards savings.11 
 
Similarly, there is some evidence that households are reducing indebtedness – yet this 
may prove to be illusory. The household debt-to-income ratio (total financial liabilities 
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as a proportion of gross disposable income) has fallen to 141 in 2013, from a height of 
169 in 2007.12 The OBR (2014), however, forecasts that, rather than continuing to 
decline, the ratio will actually return (almost) to its pre-crisis level by 2019. The amount 
owed in consumer debt has fallen to £161 billion in January 2014 from £191 billion in 
January 2007, but this is still much higher than the £116 billion owed in January 2000. 
Furthermore, a greater proportion of consumer debt is now held on credit cards, 36 per 
cent in January 2014 compared to 29 per cent in January 2007.13 
 
Earnings 
 
Evidence on changes in relative pay across sectors and regions was presented above. It 
is also worth considering earnings in general, however, given the political interest in 
this area, and the identification of stagnating earnings by ALGM analysis as a key 
precipitator of the economic downturn. Between 2008 (the pre-crisis peak, according 
the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings) and 2013, median earnings fell by 7.7 per cent 
in real terms for full-time employees. This represents an intensification of pre-crisis 
trends: from 2004 to 2008, median earnings rose by only 3. 9 per cent, compared to 
10.9 per cent from 2000 to 2004. It is of course worth reiterating that this data relates 
to full-time employees; the UK has seen a rise in both part-time work and self-
employment since 2008. Part-time employees typically earn less per hour than those 
working full-time, and while individuals in self-employment typically earned more than 
employees in the years immediately before the crisis, they now earn significantly less on 
average (Murphy, 2013). In terms of the earnings distribution, earnings at the 75th 
percentile rose slightly from 153.1 per cent of median earnings in 2007, to 154.5 per 
cent in 2013. Earnings at the 90th percentile rose from 217.1 per cent to 218.5 per cent 
over this period. Lower earnings (whether in terms of the 10th or 25th percentile) have 
fallen slightly further behind the median – reversing the slight ‘catch up’ that was 
evident in the decade up to 2007.14 
 
The failure of rebalancing? 
 
Although our analysis is inevitably partial, it is appropriate to conclude that, on the 
basis of the available evidence, there is little sign of rebalancing within the British 
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economy, on the terms publicly espoused primarily by the coalition government. Should 
we therefore conclude that rebalancing has failed? It is worth reiterating the caveats 
that such rebalancing may yet occur, and that our analysis covers issues not included 
substantively in coalition discourse. It should also be noted that the absence of 
(progress towards) balance may be due to circumstances over which the government 
has no meaningful control. This argument implies the existence of external constraints 
on what national-level governments may achieve, even in relation to the domestic 
economy. It clearly has some merit; arguing that rebalancing has not occurred is not the 
same as arguing that it could easily have been achieved if the government had been 
more committed to the agenda. On the other hand, the coalition government have 
undoubtedly claimed that rebalancing is possible. 
 
The underlying issue here, of course, is whether we should expect policy-makers’ 
communicative discourse to match ‘reality’ to any meaningful extent. It would be naïve 
to claim that the mismatch presented here is anything other than normal political fare; 
indeed, there is little basis for claiming that the mismatch related to rebalancing were 
any more pronounced than we would usually expect. However, despite this, it is 
relevant that the main thrust of coalition economic policy appears to have been 
relatively unconcerned with bringing about rebalancing, or at least highly disconnected 
from the publicly espoused agenda. Furthermore, it is also relevant that the government 
now appears to be claiming that rebalancing is happening. This rhetorical shift is 
achieved by removing some priorities from the presentation of the rebalancing agenda, 
such as reducing private debt, or by adopting far less stringent measures than those 
used here (such as evidence of any growth in manufacturing or Northern regions, 
irrespective of its relative strength) (see Osborne, 2014a; 2014b). This highlights the 
central ambiguity inherent in rebalancing discourse: it is a discourse that was always 
bound to offer some scope for claiming success, insofar as mundane economic 
circumstances can be described as evidence of rebalancing. The ostensible failure of 
rebalancing to date indicates that the main purpose of the discourse is not to win 
support for an ambitious policy programme, but rather to offer the appearance that 
radical change is being pursued, therefore offering accommodation to moderate critics 
such as Vince Cable by demonstrating a shared agenda, while at the same time 
legitimating the basic features of the existing economic order. The question of whether 
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rebalancing has failed is trumped therefore by the sense that rebalancing is both 
eminently achievable, in that it can be moulded to suit particular circumstances, but also 
quintessentially unachievable, in that it rests upon a simplistic vision of the British 
economy which appears to have been proven, in practice, impermeable to the highly 
circumscribed forms of state intervention countenanced by the rebalancing imperative.  
 
It is in this context that we refer to what might be termed the ‘communicative 
dissonance’ of rebalancing discourse – a consistent disjuncture between, on the one 
hand, the avowed central objective of government policy (at least as communicated 
publicly) and, on the other, the broad contours of substantive government economic 
policy making as gauged by a detailed analysis of policy content and implementation. 
Though communicative dissonance is, of course, to be expected in all areas of public 
policy-making and from one administration to another (communicative discourse rarely 
corresponds in any one-to-one fashion with policy content), it is, we would contend, a 
particularly distinctive feature of the coalition’s economic agenda. At a time of 
acknowledged economic crisis, that is perhaps both a surprising and a significant 
observation. We see little if any evidence that rebalancing has actively been attempted 
(even assessed in the coalition’s own terms) and yet plenty of evidence that rebalancing 
has been the defining public mantra of its period of economic policy tenure. As such, we 
suggest, rebalancing cannot be judged a failure; for there is as yet no rebalancing 
agenda to fail.   
 
Conclusion  
 
Assessing the extent to which the British economy has rebalanced offers a useful insight 
into the extent of economic change following the financial crisis. Though the evaluation 
offered in this article cannot be considered comprehensive, and indeed covers issues 
that have not been an explicit part of the coalition government’s public espoused 
rebalancing imperative, it does help us to provide perhaps the first assessment of the 
coalition’s economic policy on its own terms. Of course, it is precisely because the 
assessment is framed by the coalition’s own rhetoric on economic change that we might 
expect some progress to have been made towards economic balance. That this appears 
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not to be the case, with even the limited signs of progress in some areas likely to prove 
illusory, is surely telling. 
 
We could conclude that this apparent (if, as we have argued, somewhat misleading) 
‘failure’ is due to the inability of national-level governments to achieve substantial 
economic change, especially over a short timeframe, or because rebalancing has not 
been pursued in practice by policy-makers, despite their public pronouncements. 
However, whilst neither conclusion is wrong, each in our view misreads and 
misinterprets the purpose of rebalancing discourse, that is, to communicate the 
coalition government’s plans and expectations around the economy in a particular way, 
for public consumption. On the assessment offered here, rebalancing is not being 
achieved, but the imagery of balance and the rebalancing imperative and the implicit 
moral political economy on which it rests allows the coalition to escape responsibility 
for any failure on its part to achieve the rebalancing it ostensibly seeks, whilst 
continuing to apportion blame to others for the imbalance it is forced to seek to redress. 
Progress towards rebalancing is good (if slow); lack of progress is merely an index of 
the extent of the mess it inherited from its predecessor. More generally, the absence of 
any substantive progress to date has not deterred the coalition government from 
continuing to claim that rebalancing is both desirable and possible – seemingly because 
it offers a narrative which appears to endorse radical change, while at the same time 
legitimating the current economic order. 
 
Notes 
1. The Pension Infrastructure Platform was announced by the government in 2011, 
and is managed by the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF). In contrast to 
an initial target of £20 billion, it has attracted only around £1 billion in ‘soft’ 
commitments, with only £260 million of this committed at the time of writing. Of 
the ten funds offering soft commitments, three are conglomerates of local 
government pension funds, and four are funds related to previously nationalised 
industries. They are joined by the Lloyds TSB Group Pension Schemes – of which 
the sponsoring company is publicly owned in large part – and the Pension 
Protection Fund, a government-sponsored body which administers the pensions of 
members of insolvent funds (Mann, 2013; NAPF, 2014). 
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2. Data on output, jobs and pay by industry/sector is available on the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) website, available at www.ons.gov.uk. Pay data is from the 
Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey; this was chosen ahead of the Labour Force 
Survey as results from the former are published at a lower level of disaggregation, 
although the latter consistently reports manufacturing pay below the national 
average. 
3. Data on bank lending is available on the Bank of England’s Bankstats website, 
available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/bankstats/default.aspx. 
4. Data on output, employment and pay by region is available on the ONS website. Pay 
data is from the Labour Force Survey. 
5. Data on trade is available on the ONS website. 
6. Data on output is available on the ONS website. 
7. Data on mortgage approvals is available on the Bank of England’s Bankstats 
website. 
8. Data from the Nationwide House Price Index is available at 
http://www.nationwide.co.uk/about/house-price-index/download-data 
9. These statistics are derived from Land Registry data in combination with earnings 
data, and published by the Department for Communities and Local Government on 
the British government’s website, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-communities-
and-local-government/about/statistics. 
10. Data on housing equity withdrawal is available on the Bank of England’s Bankstats 
website. 
11. Savings ratio statistics are available on the ONS website. 
12. These statistics are derived from data on financial liabilities and disposable income 
available on the ONS website. In order to enable comparison with 2007, 2013 
liabilities refer to the end of the third quarter, and 2013 disposable income is an 
annualised amount based on data for the first three quarters. 
13. Data on consumer borrowing is available on the Bank of England’s Bankstats 
website. 
14. Data from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings on median earnings, full-time 
and part-time earnings, and the earnings distribution is available from the ONS 
website. It should be noted that slight changes in the survey’s methodology in 2004, 
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2006 and 2011 mean that annual results have been compared cautiously, although 
the changes appear to have led to only minor modifications. 
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